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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
action. This appears to be the most feasible answer and the one with
the most chance of success. Were the problem presented to the legis-
lators, the unjustness of the present rule could be readily seen and
corrected.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of the author that the court has failed
to recognize the distinction between "husband's property" as used in
non-community property jurisdictions and "husband's separate prop-
erty" as used in Washington. Further, correct analysis of this problem
in the future will require that the court distinguish the two questions
of "characterization" which are involved. Therefore, it follows that
Marsh's position is the correct one and should be used in analyzing
cases dealing with the problem.
WILLIAm H. MAYS
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Declaration of Homestead-Excess Value Subject to Judgment
Lien-Good Faith Declaration. In the case of Barouk v. Israll,'
H declared a homestead under facts which made it doubtful that the
declaration was made in good faith. H later entered into an agreement
to sell the property to P for $7,000.' A judgment was subsequently
entered in favor of D against H. H then conveyed the property to P
who did not have actual knowledge of the judgment. D then procured
a writ of execution and levied on the property. P brought this action
to quiet title and to enjoin the sale; a permanent injunction was
granted. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The court held that since there was a declaration of homestead on
file the judgment creditor of the grantor did not have a lien on the
property and, since the land had been conveyed to a bona fide
purchaser,' the judgment creditor could not contest the validity of
the declaration.
146 Wn.2d 327, 281 P.2d. 238 (1955).
2 The court apparently attached no legal significance to this point and it was not
discussed in the opinion. The writer will likewise ignore the point but it raises some
interesting questions. Was this agreement a valid executory contract for the sale of the
property? If it was, then the subsequent docketing of the judgment does not give the
vendee notice and he can continue paying the vendor and is entitled to the benefits of
these payments until he receives actual notice of the judgment. Heath v. Dodson, 7
Wn.2d 667, 110 P.2d 845 (1941). If it was not a valid contract, then the docketing of
the judgment gives constructive notice to the vendee and he is not entitled to the
benefits of payments made after the judgment was docketed. See RCW 4.64.010.
Assuming it was a valid contract, a judgment lien still attaches to the actual interest
of the vendor but the judgment does not affect the rights of the vendee. McDonald v.
Curtis, 119 Wash. 384, 205 Pac. 1041 (1922).
3 It is submitted that there is considerable doubt that P was a bona fide purchaser.
See RCW 4.64.010 et seq., which provides that after a verdict has been recorded
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It is submitted that the holding is questionable on two counts:
(1) the test adopted by the court to determine whether or not a lien
attached to the property; (2) the failure of the court to determine
whether or not the homestead was declared in good faith.
Our court has experienced difficulty in reconciling the judgment
lien statute' and the homestead statute.5 The difficulty seems to be
in determining the interplay between these two statutes when the
homestead is declared prior to the entry of a judgment against the
declarant. Does the judgment lien attach to the property of the
judgment debtor?
In the case of Traders National Bank v. Schorr6 it was held that
a judgment lien does not attach to the property which was declared a
homestead before the judgment was entered.7 This case has been
followed without question by subsequent cases.8 Out of these cases
has evolved the untenable position of our court that the declaration
of a homestead, regardless of the value of the property, absolutely
precludes a judgment lien from attaching.
The court in the Barouk case said at page 332: "At the time
appellant's judgment was obtained the property in question was not
subject to the lien of the judgment because a declaration of home-
stead, valid on its face was on file...." So then the test to determine
if a lien attaches to the property is whether or not a declaration is
on file. Assuming the declaration is made in good faith, and the
property exceeds the statutory allowance, does a lien attach to the
excess value?' If the test adopted by the court in the Barouk case
anyone subsequently acquiring the property from the judgment debtor does so with
notice of the judgment lien. So unless this statute is going to be completely ignored, a
necessary condition precedent to determining whether or not P was a bona fide purchaser
would be to determine when P acquired an interest in the property, i.e., before or after
the verdict in favor of D was entered. As was pointed out in note 2 supra, the
court failed to do this.
'RCW 4.56.190.
5RCW 6.12.010.
020 Wash. 1, 54 Pac. 543 (1898). The court also held that the judgment creditor
could not realize on the excess value of the property under the general execution statute
but must proceed under the appraisal procedure set out in RCW 6.12.140. It is
not apparent from the opinion in the Barouh case under which statute the defendant
was proceeding. If he was proceeding under the general execution statute the court was
correct in enjoining the sale but should have expressly stated this was its reason for
so holding.
7Locke v. Collins, 42 Wn2d 532, 256 P.2d 832 (1953), when the judgment is entered
before the homestead is declared, the judgment does become a lien on the property
and the subsequent declaration of homestead does not extinguish this lien but merely
"supersedes and suspends it."
s In re Shelton, 102 F. Supp. 629; Lyon v. Herboth, 133 Wash. 15, 233 Pac. 24
(1925) ; Security National Bank v. Mason, 117 Wash. 95, 200 Pac. 1097 (1921).
0 The great majority of jurisdictions that have been faced with the problem of
19561
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
is to be followed it becomes necessary to conclude that a lien would
not attach. It is submitted that such a conclusion would be demon-
strably wrong.
There is the dictum in the Schorr case that supports the position
that no lien attaches to the excess in value. In that case the court
said on page 9: ". . . and the view taken by counsel for respondents
that such lien may attach to the excess in value above the homestead
exemption is erroneous." Since this case the Washington court has
not been squarely faced with the problem of whether a lien attaches
to the excess."
In light of the existing statutes in Washington, does the mere filing
of a declaration of homestead preclude a lien from attaching to the
property? In answering this question it will be helpful to examine
the pertinent statutes. RCW 4.56.190 provides in part: "The real
estate of the judgment debtor, and such as he may acquire, not exempt,
shall be held and bound to satisfy . . . any judgment of the supreme
or superior court in this state . . . and every such judgment shall be
a lien there-upon ..... " (emphasis supplied). It would seem that a
lien attaches to all the real estate of the judgment debtor which is not
exempt. What real estate is exempt? RCW 6.12.090 provides: "The
homestead is exempt from attachment and from execution or forced
sale, except as in this chapter provided; . . ." RCW 6.12.010 defines
a homestead as: "The homestead consists of the dwelling house, in
which the claimant resides, with appurtenant buildings, and the land
on which the same are situated, and by which the same are surrounded,
or land without improvements purchased with the intention of building
a house and residing thereon...." (emphasis added). Finally, RCW
6.12.050 states: "Homesteads may be selected and claimed . . . but
not exceeding in net value... the sum of six thousand dollars."
(emphasis supplied).
So then it seems that a homestead of the value of $6,000 is all
that is exempt. Doesn't it logically follow that if the property is worth
more than the statutory limit a judgment lien attaches to the
whether a lien attaches to the excess have held that a lien does attach. See 52 A.L.R.
1333.
10 In the case of American State Bank v. Butts, 111 Wash. 612, 191 Pac. 754 (1920),
a judgment creditor sought to have a conveyance of a homestead set aside as fraudulent
so the judgment lien could attach to the excess. The court held that it had not been
proved that the homestead exceeded the statutory exception. The court could have
summarily disposed of the appeal by holding that the lien could not possibly attach to
the excess, but instead went into a lengthy discussion of the evidence offered to
establish the value of the homestead. This seems to mean that the court recognized
that a lien could attach to the excess.
[SUMMER
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excess? It seems to the writer that the existing statutes in Washington
demand that this question be answered in the affirmative. It would
be difficult for the legislature to employ language more clearly express-
ing its intent that all that is exempt is a homestead of the value of
$6000 with a lien attaching to all the excess above this amount. Yet
if the court in the Barouk case means what it says, no lien can attach
to the excess as long as a homestead declaration 'valid on its face' is
on file.
It is also important to note that the legislature has enacted a statute
which enables the judgment creditors to realize on the excess over
the exemption." Since the excess can be levied upon it is not exempt
and the judgment lien statute declares that the judgment is a lien on all
real estate not exempt.
It becomes obvious from reading the opinion in the Barouk case that
the court considered only one of the applicable statutes, viz., the honie-
stead statute, and completely ignored the judgment lien statute." The
court seemed to be relying on the generalization that if the homestead is
declared before the judgment is entered no lien attaches to the land.
The court failed to recognize that this general proposition is qualified
by the statutes discussed above. The generalization is correct only if
the property does not exceed the statutory limit of $6,000.
Rather than summarily holding that the filing of the declaration
precluded a lien from attaching to the property, it is submitted the
court should have first determined the value of the declarant's interest
in the property." If this interest exceeded $6,000 then the court should
have held a lien attached to the excess. If the declarant's interest did
not exceed $6,000 then it was correct to hold that the declaration pre-
cluded a lien from attaching to the property.
Turning now to the second doubtful point in the note case, the court
stated, at page 331: "No citation of authority is necessary for the rule
that a declaration of homestead must be made in good faith." Yet the
court neglected to determine whether or not this homestead was so
declared. The court held that the conveyance to a bona fide purchaser
conclusively settled the issue of whether or not the homestead was
declared in good faith.
11 RCW 6.12.140.
12 The court relies on the case of Meikle v. Cloquet, 44 Wash. 513, 87 Pac. 841
(1906), as authority for its holding. A reading of the Meikle case shows that the quota-
tion relied on by the court is dictum, the court having already found the statute of
limitations had run against the judgment.
13 John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 174 Wash. 185, 24 P.2d 420, 27
P.2d 1118 (1933), the value of a homestead is determined by the value of the client's
interest in the property rather than by the fee simple value of the property.
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One of the basic rules of construction, recognized by our court," is
that the construction of the statute should be made with reference to
the purpose of the statute and a construction should be avoided which
would pervert the object of the statute.
What is the purpose of our homestead laws? Our court has said the
purpose of this statute is humane, i.e., to preserve the home. If the
premises are not actually intended to be used as a home, then the
declarant is not within the protection of the statute, and the court will
not allow this statute to be perverted into a subterfuge to enable a
debtor to avoid payment of his debts.15
Yet isn't this just exactly what court has done in the Barouh case?
It appears to the writer that the decision has turned the homestead
statute into a vehicle of fraud which allows a judgment debtor to avoid
the payment of his just obligations. A holding that a purchaser of a
homestead closes the door on the judgment creditor to contest the
validity of the declaration of the homestead is a complete perversion
of the statute.
It is easy to become overly sympathetic to the purchaser, but it
must be remembered that RCW 4.64.010 et seq. gives everyone con-
structive notice of the judgment lien. The end result is that since the
purchaser has constructive notice of the judgment he can not be a bona
fide purchaser. Hence he deserves no special treatment and occupies
no better position with respect to cutting off the rights of the judgment
creditor than does the vendor." If the purchaser acquires an interest
in the property before the judgment is entered then, of course, it is
possible such a purchase is bona fide and the purchaser's rights are not
affected until he receives actual notice of the judgment."
In Code v. London 8 the court held that the judgment debtor could
not enjoin the sale of property declared as a homestead because the
declarant was not the head of a household. The court stated at page
283, "It seems to us entirely clear that, if homestead rights may be
waived or lost by abandonment, that such rights may not be obtained
in the first instance unless there is a full compliance with the statutory
requirements relative to securing the homestead exemption" (emphasis
14 State ex rel. Milwaukee Grain Elevator Co. v. Robinson, 186 Wash. 557, 59 P.2d
365 (1936) ; Smith v. St. Paul M. & M. R. Co., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840 (1905).
15 Schoenhieder v. Dehne, 96 Wash. 103, 164 Pac. 748 (1917).
16 The judgment debtor can not enjoin the judgment creditor from levying on the
property when the declaration of homestead was not made in good faith. Traverso v.
Cerini, 146 Wash. 273, 263 Pac. 184 (1928) ; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Kellough,
142 Wash. 335, 253 Pac. 124 (1927) ; Schoenheider v. Dehne, supra, note 15.
17 Heath v. Dodson, note 2, supra.
1s 27 Wn.2d 279, 178 P.2d 293 (1947).
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supplied). Another requisite of our homestead statute before a
homestead can be created is an intent by the declarant to reside
thereon."a It would seem then that if the homestead is not declared
in good faith, (i.e., the declarant has no intention of using the
property as a home), such a declaration does not give rise to a home-
stead which is exempt because there has not been full compliance with
the statutory requirements. If the land is not exempt then of course
the judgment becomes a lien against the property.
It is submitted that the mere filing of a declaration alone does not
create a homestead exemption, but in addition to the filing of a declara-
tion, the declarant must have a bona fide intention of using the property
as a home. The absence of either of these two requisites would prevent
the creation of a homestead. The court in the Barouk case seems to
hold that the requirement of intending to use the property as a home is
not necessary when a third party enters the picture. This is an
example of judicial legislation rather than judicial interpretation.
REx M. WALKER
Creditors' Rights-Priority of Federal Tax Lien Over Mechanic's and Materia-
man's Lien. In the case of Fleming v. Brownfield, 147 Wash. Dec. 772, 290 P.2d 993
(1955), the plaintiff, pursuant to the applicable statutes, filed a claim for a mechanic's
and materialman's lien on September 18, 1953. Subsequently on the sixth of October
1953 the United States filed a notice of its tax lien. Plaintiff brought this action to
foreclose his lien and the trial court found that the local lien was superior to the
United States tax lien. The trial court's holding was reversed by the supreme
court and the tax lien was given priority even though subsequent in time.
The court based its opinion on the case of United States v. Security Trust and
Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), which held that only those liens which are prior
in time and "specific and perfected" are superior to federal tax liens. The court
concluded that since RCV 60.04.100 requires that an action be commenced to fore-
close the local lien, such a lien is not specific and perfected under federal law but a
mere contingent and inchoate lien and not superior even though first in-time. Apparently
before our local mechanic's and materialman's lien can be superior to federal tax
liens the local lien must be converted into a judgment before the federal tax assessment
list is received by the collector.
Mechanics Lien-Authority of Administrator. The case of Larson v. Ducks.
46 Wn.2d 344, 281 P.2d 458 (1955), was an action to foreclose statutory liens for labor
and materials. The court had the following question before it: does the administrator
of an estate, acting without the authority of the court, have power to enter into a
valid contract on behalf of the estate to erect an addition to the estate property? The
question was answered in the negative. The court reasoned that since the administrator
could not charge the estate for the costs of the addition, the contractor and materialmen
who performed the contract could not possibly have liens against the property of
10 RCW 6.12.010, RCW 6.12.060.
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the estate. Although the court did not expressly state why it was impossible for a
lien to attach, the apparent reason is that if the lien was allowed this would be indirectly
charging the estate for the contract which was directly unenforceable. The decision is
one of first impression in Washington but is in harmony with the holdings of other
jurisdictions which have passed on the question. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Fairchild,
134 Cal. 220, 66 Pac. 255 (1901) ; Ness v. Wood, 42 Minn. 427, 44 N. W. 313 (1890).
CRIMINAL LAW
Bigamy-Necessity of Proving Continued Cohabitation. In State
v. Lewis' the court found it necessary to interpret the bigamy statute,'
which reads in part: "Every person who, having a husband or wife
living, shall marry another person, or continue to cohabit with such
second husband or wife in this state, shall be guilty of bigamy .... "
The information charged that the defendant, having a wife living,
did cohabit with a second wife in this state. The trial judge sustained
the defendant's demurrer. The supreme court affirmed the trial court
ruling that the allegation failed to charge a criminal offense. The
court said that where the second marriage was entered into in this state,
an act prohibited by the first provision of the statute, cohabitation need
not be alleged or proved. The second provision was placed in the Act
to meet those situations where a person contracts a bigamous marriage
in another state and thereafter moves into this state and continues to
cohabit with the second spouse in this state. Under that provision the
prosecution must allege and prove, not merely that the defendant has
cohabited with second wife in this state, but that the defendant con-
tinues to so cohabit.
The court stated that, under the statute, cohabitation must have
commenced in another state and continued in this state. Under this
interpretation we have two situations which are not prohibited but
which the legislature no doubt intended to include within the statute.
First, if the accused entered into the second marriage in another state
and immediately brought his second spouse into Washington where
cohabitation commenced, the accused's conduct would not come within
the scope of the statute as there could be no cohabitation in another
state which could be continued into Washington. The court in the
Lewis case was not willing to follow the reasoning of the Iowa court'
which assumed that because a marriage took place in another state,
cohabitation commenced. Secondly, if the accused4 entered into the
1 State v. Lewis, 46 Wn2d 438, 282 P.2d 297 (1955).
2 RCW 9.15.010.
3 State v. Nadal, 69 Iowa 478, 29 N.W. 451 (1886).
4 The accused may he either a man or a woman, as the case may be. For the purpose
of this discussion it is convenient to speak of the accused as the male spouse.
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